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Abstract 
During 2012–2013, the homicide rate in El Salvador came down from 69.9 to 42.2 per 100,000 population following a 
government brokered truce between the leaders of the two major gangs, Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18. But despite 
the apparent successes of the truce, it was speculated that the drop in murders could have been due to the killers 
simply hid the bodies of their victims. This paper aims at determining whether gangs effectively disappeared their 
victims to cut down the official counts of murders, or they committed these crimes for other reasons. The results from 
this study suggest that Salvadoran gangs had been using disappearance as a method to gain sustained social control 
among residents of already gang-dominated areas, that together with homicide, disappearance is part of a process 
of territorial spread and strategic strengthening by which these groups are enhancing their capabilities to interfere 
in the alliances of Mexican drug trafficking organizations with Central American criminal organizations specializing in 
the trans-shipment of drugs and in providing access to local markets to distribute and sell drugs. Our findings show 
that the risk for disappearance has been large even before the truce was in place and that actually, it continues as 
such and going through a process of geographic expansion.
Keywords: El Salvador, Maras, Bayesian mapping, Trends in disappearance, Homicide trends,  
Bayesian shared component model
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Maras and violence in El Salvador
El Salvador, together with Guatemala and Honduras, 
is part of the so called Northern Triangle of Central 
America, arguably the most violent region in the world. 
The country is affected by a strong mara presence and 
is part of the drug trafficking corridor linking South 
America to the United States. In this paper, the terms 
mara and gang are used interchangeably to refer to both 
the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, either Sureños or 
Revolucionarios.
Unlike other street gangs, the maras are hierarchical 
organizations that coordinate their criminal activities 
across the United States, Mexico and Central America; 
fight against the authorities and against each other, for 
control of turf and local distribution of drugs; and use 
violence both against rivals and within their own groups 
to maintain internal order (Bruneau 2011).
Despite the widespread of maras in El Salvador, there 
is not an agreed figure, either official or otherwise, on the 
number of individuals belonging to or related to these 
groups. Over the years, estimates of the number of gangs 
and gang members have varied depending on the source. 
For instance and according to the National Civilian 
Police, there were 10,500 active gang members in 2005, 
but the extinct National Council of Public Safety counted 
approximately 39,000 (Kinnear 2009). In 2015, an esti-
mated 55,000 persons were gang members, with an esti-
mated 470,000 affiliated with the gangs, including family 
members, friends and helpers, organized in 560 clicas 
nationwide (Ellis 2015).
These groups are held responsible for at least 60% of all 
homicides committed in El Salvador (Wolf 2011) but also 
are involved, inter alia, in extortion, kidnapping, rape, 
and the local distribution of drugs. In recent years, maras 
have evolved into complex criminal organizations associ-
ated with the drug trafficking transport networks tied to 
Mexican cartels, and are in possession of “assault rifles, 
vehicles, safe houses, encrypted satellite phones and are 
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even able to deploy drones to monitor the movements 
of police or rival gangs”. Maras “enforce curfews, man 
roadblocks to control access to their neighborhoods, and 
decide who can sell or move drugs and where. The maras 
have become more like political military forces than 
street gangs” (Farah 2016).
In March 2012, the government brokered a truce 
between the Salvadorian maras during which the homi-
cide rate dropped by half. However, it has been alleged 
that under the truce, the maras hid the large numbers of 
people still being killed by burying them in clandestine 
cemeteries. Forcible displacement and forced migration 
are other phenomena that have also been attributed to 
maras and criminal organizations such as drug trans-
porters and cartels as well (Farah 2012; Stone 2012, 2013; 
Sánchez-Aiscorbe 2014; Cantor 2014; Ellis 2015).
National survey data show at least 12,600 and 29,400 
disappearances in 2012 and 2014, respectively. The num-
ber of persons forced to change their place of residence 
due to threats increased from at least 29,500 in 2012 to 
64,400 in 2014 (IUDOP 2012, 2015). According to Sal-
vadorian authorities, a significant number of disap-
pearances are related to gang activity, since many of the 
missing were in gangs, or friends or relatives of gang 
members (US Department of State 2016).
The role that organized crime groups, maras included, 
might play in generating these events is little-studied. In 
El Salvador, a link between disappearances and homi-
cides remains a distinct possibility. One may consider 
these phenomena as arising from unobserved common 
sources. Though there are no reliable data on the attri-
bution of both these crimes, media and official reports 
suggest that at least under the truce, the maras may have 
perpetrated most of the disappearances recorded by the 
Salvadorian authorities (Farah 2012; Ellis 2015).
Models of spatial variation in crime rates and other 
crime related outcomes use location as a surrogate for 
the mix of routine activities, environmental clues and 
conditions, and opportunity structures that may under-
lie geographic differences in risk. As many crimes share 
common risk factors, analyzing their joint spatial behav-
ior may help in obtaining more evidence of real cluster-
ing in the risk surface than would be available from the 
analysis of a single type of crime.
This research investigates the hypothesis that both 
homicide and disappearance are outcomes from unob-
served processes associated to a greater extent with geo-
graphic variations of mara related activities. We expect 
that a significant between-municipality variation in rela-
tive risk of disappearance be explained by its joint spa-
tial variation with homicide through a common cause, 
namely maras. A Bayesian approach is implemented to 
account for the uncertainty due to the fact that the data 
cannot fully inform whether this expected strong corre-
lation between homicides and disappearances is due to 
gang activity.
This paper contributes to the discussion of patterns of 
gang violence in Central America, particularly in El Sal-
vador. It explores the joint spatio-temporal behavior of 
homicides and disappearances over 2010–2014, a period 
covering March 2012–April 2013, the 14  months under 
the gang truce.
The paper continues with a review of homicide rates 
showing their decline during the early truce, followed by 
a discussion on how forced disappearances explain this 
dip and how those relate to maras. Then, we review and 
analyze the data on forced disappearances using an unob-
served component model. Presentation and discussion of 
results precede the conclusion. References and acknowl-
edgements are included at the end of the paper.
Pre‑truce and post‑truce homicide rates
Figure 1 shows homicide rates computed over 4 consecu-
tive government periods. The first running from June 
1999 to May 2004, recorded 39.7 homicides per 100,000 
population and was scenery to the so called “Strong Hand 
Plan” that was implemented in 2003 under President 
Francisco Flores with the main objective of breaking up of 
gangs. It contemplated joint actions by the national police 
(PNC) and the army. The rate increased to 58.8 over June 
2004–May 2009 in which the newly elected government 
of President Antonio Saca implemented what they named 
as “Ultra Strong Hand” policy, a set of actions aimed at 
fighting gangs, drug trafficking and money laundering.
The homicide rate went up to 61.7 murders per 100,000 
during the first half of the government period of Presi-
dent Mauricio Funes, June 2009–February 2012. From 
March 2012 to May 2013, the two major gangs, the Mara 
Salvatrucha and Barrio 18, negotiated a 15 month truce, 


































Fig. 1 El Salvador, homicide rates per 100,000 over different periods
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local drug traffickers and supported by the Organization 
of American States, under which the homicide rate felt 
down to 41.8. The truce aimed at reducing the numbers 
of murders in exchange for granting concessions to incar-
cerated gang leaders. The maras used the truce, particu-
larly the MS-13, “to rearm, reorganize, build closer ties to 
regional cocaine transport networks, develop a political 
and economic strategy, and evolve from street gangs to 
criminal organizations with territorial and political con-
trol” (Farah 2016).
During the following 18  months, from June 2013 to 
December 2014, following the sitting of President Salva-
dor Sánchez Cerén, who backed off from the truce and 
adopted a strategy based on a frontal combat to gangs, 
the homicide rate more than doubled to reach 86.8 per 
100,000 residents.
Disappearances and homicides
The possibility that the decline in recorded homicide 
under the gang truce might have been accompanied by 
increases in the numbers of disappearances has been 
sustained by both the media and local crime and safety 
experts (Savenije and Van der Borgh 2014; Rivera Virúes 
2014). In early 2014, the Instituto de Medicina Legal 
reported that during the truce, the number of disappeared 
had risen by an almost identical amount to the decline 
in the number of homicides. There is a strong belief that 
gangs used disappearances to bring homicide counts 
artificially down. Figure 2 shows police recorded cases of 
missing or disappeared persons per 100,000 population 
during each of the 5  years from 2010 to 2014. The rate 
went up from 6 0 in 2010 to 37.4 in 2014. In particular, it 
increased from 15.8 in 2011 to 26. 1 in 2012 and to 30.7 in 
2013 (i.e. the years when the gang truce was in place).
Figure  3 shows relative risks or standardized rates for 
both homicides and disappearances across municipalities 
and over time periods.
There were 81 municipalities with homicide risks 
exceeding one in 2010–2011 (first row and first col-
umn). Under the truce (i.e. 2012–2013), in 57 out of these 
municipalities, the risk dropped down to values that were 
smaller than one (second row and first column). On the 
other hand, in 2010–2011 there were 237 municipalities 
where the risk of disappearance took on values below one 
(first row and second column), 66 of which increased the 
risk to values greater than one during 2012–2013 (second 
row and second column). The maps in the third row of 
Fig. 3 show that following the end of the truce (2014), rel-
ative risks for both homicide and disappearance did not 
only increase but also seemed to have modified their geo-
graphical patterns.
Disappearances and maras
Disappearances are not a new phenomenon to Salvadorian 
society. At least 8000 persons disappeared during the civil 
war of 1980s (Commission on the Truth for El Salvador 
1993). During the last 10  years or so, forceful disappear-
ances have occurred within a context of intense gang activ-
ity, mainly by the Mara Salvatrucha and Barrio 18 gangs. 
The nature of gang-related disappearances is not clear cut. 
While it is true that the disappearance of a person implies 
her kidnapping, the most likely set up of most of the Sal-
vadorian disappearances involves the murder and further 
clandestine burial by a gang, within the limits of a gang-
dominated territory. The apparent gain of political power 
by maras as evidenced by an enhanced capacity to nego-
tiate with government, together with an undisputed con-
trol over significant parts of the country’s territory and 
penitentiary facilities, may lead one to think of Salvado-
rian gangs as organizations that have evolved into a mix 
of mafia-like organizations and some form of politically 
motivated groups with characteristics that may be similar 
to those observed in paramilitary groups of Colombia and 
Mexico (Farah and Phillips Lum 2013; Ellis 2015).
The data in Figs.  2 and 3 provide support to the 
claim in Rivera Virúes (2014) that Salvadorian gangs 
are extending the use of the killing and secret burial of 
their victims. Initially and as a response to a government 
approach to crime control characterized by increased 
presence of police and army in the streets, gangs reduced 
the numbers of homicides committed in public places 
and replaced them with the clandestine burial of their 
victims.
Also and similar to forceful displacement (Cantor 
2014) gangs might use disappearances to gain social 
control through either the intimidation of the residents 
of dominated territories, or ensuring their cooperation 
in protecting themselves against rival gangs or police. 
Demanding concessions from government to impris-




































Fig. 2 El Salvador, 2010–2014, disappeared persons per 100,000
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disappearances (Rivera Virúes 2014). In 2010–2012, the 
country suffered a wave of disappearances, mostly young 
people and teenagers, who went missing without expla-
nation in a phenomenon linked to the gang violence hit-
ting the country (Stone 2011, 2013; Sánchez-Aiscorbe 
2014). In El Salvador, most accounts on this type of vio-
lence come from the media.
Outside the context of political violence and drug 
wars, in Latin America, the disappearance of persons 
has been related to paramilitary groups as in the case of 
Colombia (Rozema 2008; Hristov 2010), and the so called 
self-defense forces, as in Mexico (Santamaría 2014). Lit-
erature on disappearances related to gang activity is 
almost inexistent. Rivera Virués (2014) is the only aca-
demic work on the topic that also refers to the specific 
case of El Salvador.
Based on field research, Cantor (2014) analyzed the 
broad dynamics of the closely related phenomenon 
Fig. 3 Relative risk for homicide and disappearance
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of forced displacement provoked by organized crime 
groups—maras, Central American drug transporters, 
and Mexican drug cartels. Structural differences between 
these groups influence both the forms of displacement 
that they produce and the resulting patterns of move-
ment by displaced persons. The reasons underlying 
someone’s disappearance, killing and secret burial might 
be similar to those causing displacement. Disappearance 
can be dealt with as an intermediate outcome in the pro-
cess of population displacement caused by gangs.
Cantor (2014, p. 11) proposed two distinctive forms of 
population displacement: those resulting from the “eve-
ryday activities” of criminal groups; and those result-
ing from the periodic violent disputes between them. 
Regarding the former and from the standpoint of the 
criminal group, displacement may occur due to betrayal 
or enmity; resistance; land appropriation; and insecu-
rity. Grounds for displacement related to the latter have 
to do with disputes between gangs, between Transpor-
tistas and between Mexican cartels. We pay attention to 
possible links between “everyday activities” of gangs and 
disappearances.
In El Salvador and at the national level, the Mara Sal-
vatrucha and the Barrio 18 gangs are structured through 
prison-based “councils” of leaders that provide only 
broad direction to local groups of mara members known 
as clicas, each of which operates with a large degree of 
autonomy in its own territory. Gangs operate in urban 
and sub-urban areas and divide their territory into a cli-
ca’s” core and “extended” zones of operation. Members of 
the clica live in the “core” zone that is located in one or 
more marginal urban neighborhood and from it carries 
localized criminal activities such as drug-dealing. These 
areas concentrate unusually large rates of violence. The 
“extended” areas are those where clicas enter more spo-
radically to extort businesses and sometimes residents, 
and where there is presence of public and private secu-
rity. In “core” zones, the clicas ensure the support from 
local residents by imposing codes of conduct on them. 
Observance of these rules is backed up by violence and 
other control mechanisms (Cantor 2014, p. 7).
On this research
This paper uses data on official records of disappear-
ances and homicides to explore joint spatial behavior 
across municipalities in El Salvador over the period 
2010–2014. It aims at identifying spatial patterns to the 
practice of forced disappearances by maras by exploring 
their spatial correlation with homicides. We separate the 
underlying risk surface for each crime into a shared and 
a crime specific component. We predict the strongest 
effect of the unobserved shared component on the risk of 
disappearance.
Methods
A Bayesian model with shared components (Knorr-Held 
and Best 2001) was implemented to jointly account for 
the effect of unobserved common influences on the risk 
of both the disappearance of persons and homicide. This 
approach was deemed convenient as it was believed that 
most variation in relative risk was due to differences in 
gang activity across municipalities.
The data for this study consisted of the numbers of disap-
peared persons and homicides occurring at each of the 262 
municipalities across the country over the 5  year period 
spanning from 2010 to 2014. Data on homicides were 
obtained from the Instituto de Medicina Legal, and data on 
disappeared persons came from the Policía Nacional Civil. 
Official population projections obtained from the Direc-
ción General de Estadística y Censos were used in the com-
putation of rates. We analyze the data over three periods: 
2010–2011 (prior to the gang truce), 2012–2013 (under the 
truce), and 2014 (following the end of the truce).
Let the i index designate a municipality, (i = 1, 2, . . . , 262), 
and the k index, a specific outcome, k = 1 for disappear-
ance and 2 for homicide. The number of incidents in 
municipality i for outcome k, Yik, follows a Poisson dis-
tribution with mean Eik θik. In this expression, θik is the 
unknown relative risk of person disappearance or homi-
cide and Eik is the expected number of disappeared per-
sons or homicides in municipality i. Risks are estimated 
by (indirectly) standardized rates (SRs). In order to imple-
ment the Bayesian approach to the modeling of disap-
pearance and homicide risk, a same Poisson distribution 
was assumed at the first level of hierarchy, given by
The use of SRs as estimates of relative risk assumes a 
constant rate over each local area and outcome. For rare 
events such as disappearances or homicides, the varia-
tion in the numbers of incidents exceeds that predicted 
by a Poisson process. Extra variation may arise either 
from common unobserved heterogeneity that may be 
dominated by gang activity, or from the spatial cluster-
ing of incidences, or both. Allowing area-specific risks 
to depend on a latent variable (a random effect), the 
variance of which reflects the degree of extra-Poisson 
variation, is a standard approach to accommodate over-
dispersion in counts in the epidemiological literature 
(Mollié 2000; Lawson 2013 and references therein).
At the second level of the hierarchy, the logarithms of 
the relative risks were defined as
and
(1)Yik |θik ∼ Poisson(Eikθik)
(2)log(θi1) = α1 + δWi +Ui1, for disappearance,
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In these expressions, U1i is a separate random com-
ponent for disappearance, Wi represents the shared 
component, and α1 and α2 are specific intercepts for 
disappearance and homicide, respectively. Finally, δ is a 
scaling component for the contribution of the shared 
component to the overall relative risk that allows for dif-
ferential risk gradients (on the log-scale) for each crime.
Prior distributions needed to be assigned to the param-
eters. The α parameters were assigned improper uniform 
priors on the whole real line. The choice of these priors 
expressed the absence of genuine prior expectations on 
the parameter values. A normal prior with zero mean 
and variance σ2 δ was given to the logarithm of the scaling 
parameter (δ).
Conditionally autoregressive (CAR) priors (Besag et al. 
1991) were used for the spatially structured random 
effects (U1i) and the common component random effect 
(Wi). Under the CAR specification and for a given munic-
ipality, the mean of U1i and Wi depends upon the U1i′s 
and Wi′s of its neighboring municipalities. More formally,
and
where, U1i = 1mi
∑
j �=i
ωi,jUj, Wi = 1mi
∑
j �=i




and σ 2Wi =
σ 2W
mi
, with ωi,j = 1 if the i-th and j-th municipal-
ities were neighbors and mi was the number of munici-
palities that were neighbors to the i-th municipality.
Variance parameters σ 2u and σ 2w control the variability 
of the random effects Ui and Wi conditional upon the 
random effects in the neighboring municipalities, respec-
tively. At the next level of hierarchy, uniform hyper-priors 
(i.e. U(0, 10)) were assigned to the variance parameters 
(σ 2w, σ 2u).
We fitted the model in (1) and (2) to data on disap-
pearances and homicide for three separate time periods. 
The first of these periods, 2010–2011, preceded the gang 
truce; the second, 2012–2013, corresponded to the time 
when the truce was in place; and 2014, when the truce 
was over.
The model was fitted using WinBUGS (Lunn et  al. 
2000), a programming language based software imple-
menting MCMC algorithms to generate random samples 
from posterior distributions. The WinBUGS code for 
the model in (1) and (2) is available on request from the 
first author. Two chains were run and convergence was 
achieved by 20,000 iterations. A further 20,000 samples 
were run for each chain to obtain the desired posteriors 














with Monte Carlo errors lower than 5% of the posterior 
standard deviation.
The general structure of the shared component model 
in (1) and (2) is discussed in Lawson (2013, p. 209). Ear-
nest et al. (2010), MacNab (2010) and Chamanpara et al. 
(2015) are examples of recent applications in epidemiol-
ogy. To the best of our knowledge and at the time of writ-
ing, the literature does not report on uses of this type of 
models in criminology.
From a criminological perspective, the shared common 
spatial component helps in understanding likely shifts 
in gang related violence to an increased use of the dis-
appearance and further murder of individuals to either 
respond to police operations, or to adapt to new develop-
ments in drug markets or organized crime activities, or 
securing the control of territories, or all of the above.
Results and discussion
The deviance information criterion (DIC) (Spiegelhalter 
et  al. 2002) was used to assess the fit and identification 
of the model in (1–2) relative to a simpler model without 
a shared component. Models with smaller DIC are con-
sidered better. For each of the three periods, the shared 
component model had smaller DIC scores compared 
to separate models for disappearance and homicide 
(Table 1).
Table 2 details the model parameters from the shared 
component model. For disappearances, the ratio of rela-
tive risk associated with the shared component was found 
to be 1.85 (95% CI 1.04–4.00) in 2010–2011, 1.40 (95% CI 
0.99–2.23) in 2012–2013, and 1.97 (95% CI 1.32–3.63) in 
2014, indicating that unobserved gang activity common 
to both outcomes has a strong association with the dis-
appearance of persons. The model also shows that 79, 46 
and 66% of the between-municipality variation in relative 
risk of disappearance is explained by the shared compo-
nent during 2010–2011, 2012–2013 and 2014, respec-
tively. These figures indicate the presence of a strong 
spatial pattern in both homicide and disappearance.
The delta coefficient measuring the spatial correla-
tion of homicide and disappearance took on values of 
0.71 (95% CI 0.42–0.99) in 2010–2011, 0.84 (95% CI 
0.67–1.00) in 2012–2013, and 0.73 (95% CI 0.59–0.87) in 
2014, a result supporting the hypothesis that both homi-
cide and disappearance are outcomes from unobserved 
processes associated with geographic variations of mara 
related activities (see last row of Table  2). As expected, 
the correlation of homicide and disappearances was 
strongest in 2012 the year the gang truce was in place 
(0.84) but this coefficient was large before the truce (0.71 
in 2010–2011) and remained as such after the truce was 
over (0.73 in 2014).
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For disappearance, municipal-level relative risks have 
varied around average values of 0.144, 0.684 and 0.887 
during 2010–2011, 2012–2013 and 2014, respectively. In 
the case of homicide, municipal-level relative risks have 
varied around average values of 0.677, 0.538 and 0.795 
over the same periods. These estimates suggest a conver-
gence in national average relative risks of disappearance 
and homicide over time.
Figure  4 displays the overall posterior mean rela-
tive risk from the shared component model for both 
homicide and disappearance. The data suggest that prior 
to the gang truce (i.e. 2010–2011), the relative risk for 
disappearance was larger in municipalities that also had 
large relative risks for homicide, most of them located 
in the central part of the country. During the truce (i.e. 
2012–2013), the relative risk for homicide concentrated 
in a few municipalities located along the Pacific coast and 
one municipality located in the North–Eastern region. 
On the other hand and always during the time the gang 
truce was in place, the relative risk for disappearance 
Table 1 Summary of deviance information criteria for competing models
2010–2011 2012–2013 2014
pD DIC pD DIC pD DIC
Shared component model
Disappearances 118.51 811.00 142.44 1190.72 141.19 1091.74
Homicide 187.69 1495.18 145.82 1391.65 162.92 1313.77
Total 306.19 2306.18 288.26 2582.38 304.11 2405.51
Individual models
Disappearances 120.85 815.95 144.41 1203.09 144.39 1104.28
Homicide 189.46 1496.30 151.28 1398.65 166.30 1318.35
Table 2 Summary of model parameters
2010–2011 2012–2013 2014























level risk of 
homicide—
exp (α2)














0.79 0.66 0.83 0.46 0.42 0.48 0.66 0.63 0.67
Delta coef-
ficient δ
0.71 0.42 0.99 0.84 0.67 1.00 0.73 0.59 0.87
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not only continued being large for many of the munici-
palities where it also was large in the previous period (i.e. 
2010–2011), but spread over municipalities located in the 
Eastern side of El Salvador. Finally, the maps in the last 
row of Fig. 4 indicate that after the truce was over, homi-
cide risk recovered the spatial distribution it had during 
2010–2011 whereas the risk of disappearance continued 
spreading over the territory.
These results suggest that in gang-dominated areas, 
the risk for disappearance has been large even before the 
truce was in place and that actually, it continues as such 
and going through a process of geographic expansion. 
These findings are consistent with an explanation of the 
phenomenon as a component of a strategy aimed at gain-
ing sustained social control among residents of already 
gang controlled areas. According to the Salvadorian 
police, nearly 90% of disappeared persons are murdered 
by gangs. Clandestine graves are the final destination of 
most persons going disappeared. During 2007–2013, the 
Fiscalía General de la República conducted 145 inhuma-
tions in 30 clandestine cemeteries. Around 2007–2009, 
cemeteries were located in semi-rural deprived and gang- 
controlled communities of municipalities of the San Sal-
vador metropolitan area. During 2009–2010, clandestine 
graves were discovered in the rural areas of the munici-
palities of Santa Ana and Usulután, located in the Western 
and Eastern sides of the country, respectively. Between 
2011 and 2013, clandestine cemeteries were found in 
most of the territory indicating an expansion of the phe-
nomenon (Rivera Virúes 2014, p. 61–62; Farah, 2016).
Figure 5 displays relative risk associated with the shared 
component. The maps might be taken as estimates of the 
evolution of the spatial distribution of gangs in El Salva-
dor during 2010–2014. The data provide support to an 
explanation of violence as part of a process of territorial 
expansion and strengthening by maras to enhance their 
capabilities to interfere in the likely alliances of Mexican 
drug trafficking organizations with Central American 
criminal organizations specializing in the trans-shipment 
of drugs and in providing access to local markets to dis-
tribute and sell drugs (Dudley 2011; Santamaría 2014; 
Farah 2016).
Conclusion
This research implemented a Bayesian shared com-
ponent model across municipalities of El Salvador to 
identify spatial patterns to the practice of forced disap-
pearances by maras by exploring their spatial correlation 
Fig. 4 Posterior median relative risks for disappearance and homicide in El Salvador from the shared component model
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with homicides. We separated the underlying risk surface 
for each crime into a shared component, namely mara 
activity, and a crime specific component. We used data 
for three periods—before the truce (2010–2011), under 
the truce (2012–2013), and after the truce (2014)—to 
examine the hypothesis that most spatial variation in 
the relative risk of both homicide and disappearance 
is due to differences in unobserved gang activity across 
municipalities.
In 2012–2013, the El Salvador’s government alleg-
edly brokered a truce between the Mara Salvatrucha 
and the Barrio 18 gang. Police data reveal that during 
the truce, homicides dropped by half. It has been argued 
that this decrease was not real due to large amounts of 
Fig. 5 Shared relative risk
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disappeared persons. Police statistics indicate that the 
numbers of disappearances almost doubled during 2012–
2013. It has been argued that the maras hid the large 
numbers of people still being killed by burying them in 
clandestine cemeteries.
The correlation of homicide and disappearances was 
strongest in 2012 the year the gang truce was in place 
but it was already large before the truce and remained as 
such after the truce was over. This finding suggests that—
contrary to widely cited claims—Salvadorian maras did 
not initiate disappearances during the truce as a means 
of keeping the homicide rates low but there is a wider 
pattern to the practice of forced disappearances by these 
groups. This seems to be part of a strategy by maras to 
induce loyalty among members and other residents of 
their territorial strongholds, ensure compliance with sys-
tematic extortion demands and with mara codes seeking 
to eradicate alternative power structures as well.
Our findings show that as expected, there is a strong 
spatial pattern in both homicide and disappearance, and 
that most of this variation is associated with variations 
of mara related activities. These activities concentrate in 
geographical corridors connecting municipalities located 
along key drug-trafficking routes.
In El Salvador and since the truce, the risk for disap-
pearance has continued extending over greater areas of 
the territory, a fact that suggests a wider pattern to the 
practice of forced disappearances by maras. Both forced 
disappearance and homicide are key parts of a process 
of territorial expansion by which maras enhance their 
capabilities to interfere in the alliances of Mexican drug 
trafficking organizations with Central American criminal 
organizations. These groups specialize in the trans-ship-
ment of drugs and in providing access to local markets to 
distribute and sell drugs.
The main policy implication deriving from this research 
has to do with the need for the Salvadorian government to 
regain the territorial and social control of expanding por-
tions of the country. Either the Mara Salvatrucha or the 
Barrio 18 or both gangs seem to be involved in a conflict 
around the control of drug transport and distribution 
routes that are managed by other criminal organizations, 
allegedly linked to the Mexican drug trafficking groups and 
that most probably hold strong connections with locals.
Authors’ contributions
CC designed the study, wrote the WinBugs code, conducted the statistical 
analyses, interpreted the results and drafted the manuscript. EA wrote, revised 
and implemented the WinBugs code, and helped interpreting the results and 
drafting the manuscript. Both authors read and approved the final manuscript.
Acknowledgements
The authors express thanks to the anonymous reviewers for their insightful 
and constructive comments.
Competing interests
Both authors declare that they have no competing interests.
Received: 27 January 2016   Accepted: 19 November 2016
References
Besag, J., York, J., & Mollié, A. (1991). Bayesian image restoration with applica-
tions in spatial statistics (with discussion). Ann Inst Math Stat, 43, 1–59.
Bruneau, T. (2011). Introduction. In T. Bruneau, L. Dammert, & Skinner, E (Eds.) 
Maras: Gang Violence and Security in Central America (pp. l–l9). Austin: 
University of Texas Press.
Cantor, D. J. (2014). The new wave: Forced displacement caused by organ-
ized crime in Central America and Mexico. Refugee survey quarterly. 
http://rsq.oxfordjournals.org/content/early/2014/06/10/rsq.hdu008.full.
pdf+html. Accessed 13 Nov 2015.
Chamanpara, P., Moghimbeigi, A., Faradmal, J., & Poorolajal, J. (2015). Joint dis-
ease mapping of two digestive cancers in Golestan Province, Iran using a 
shared component model. Osong Public Health Res Perspect, 6(3), 205–210.
Commission on the Truth for El Salvador. (1993).From madness to hope: the 
12-year was in El Salvador. Report of the Commission on the Truth in El 
Salvador. UN Security Council, Annex S/25550.
Dudley, S. S. (2011). Drug trafficking organizations in Central America: Trans-
portistas, Mexican cartels and maras. In C. J. Arson and E. L. Olson (Eds.), 
Organized crime in Central America: The Northern triangle (pp. 104–139). 
Woodrow Wilson Center Reports on the Americas # 29. Washington DC: 
Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.
Earnest, A., Beard, J. R., Morgan, G., Lincoln, D., Summerhayes, R., Donoghue, D., 
et al. (2010). Small area estimation of sparse disease counts using shared 
component models-application to birth defect registry data in New 
South Wales, Australia. Health Place, 16, 684–693.
Ellis, R. E. (2015).The gang challenge in El Salvador: worse than you thought. 
War on the Rocks. http://warontherocks.com/2015/12/the-gang-chal-
lenge-in-el-salvador-worse-than-you-can-imagine/. Accessed 2 July 2016.
Farah, D. (2012). The transformation of El Salvador’s gangs into political actors. 
Hemisphere Focus. Centre for Strategic and International Studies. Wash-
ington DC. https://www.csis.org/analysis/transformation-el-salvadors-
gangs-political-actors. Accessed 2 July 2016.
Farah, D. (2016). Central American gangs are all grown up. Foreign Policy. 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/01/19/central-americas-gangs-are-all-
grown-up/. Accessed 14 June 2016.
Farah, D., Phillips Lum P. (2013). Central American gangs and transnational 
criminal organizations. The changing relationships in a time of turmoil. 
International Assessment and Strategic Center. Washington DC. http://
www.strategycenter.net/research/pubID.302/pub_detail.asp. Accessed 2 
July 2016.
Hristov, J. (2010). Self-defense forces, warlords or criminal gangs? Towards a 
new conceptualization of Paramilitarism in Colombia, labour, capital and 
society, 43:2, 2010. http://www.yorku.ca/cerlac/Hristov.pdf. Accessed 20 
Nov 2015.
IUDOP (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública). (2012). Encuesta de eval-
uación año 2012. Consulta de Opinión Pública, Noviembre 2012. Universidad 
Centroamericana. Universidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas. San 
Salvador. http://www.uca.edu.sv/publica/iudop/archivos/informe131.pdf. 
Accessed 15 June 2016.
IUDOP (Instituto Universitario de Opinión Pública). (2015). Encuesta de 
evaluación año 2014. Consulta de Opinión Pública, Noviembre 2014. Uni-
versidad Centroamericana José Simeón Cañas. San Salvador. http://www.
uca.edu.sv/iudop/wp-content/uploads/INFORME-137.pdf. Accessed 15 
June 2016.
Kinnear, K. L. (2009). Gangs: a reference handbook. 2nd Edition. (Contemporary 
World Issues). Santa Barbara: ABC CLIO.
Knorr-Held, L., Best, N. (2001). Shared component models for detecting joint 
and selective clustering of two diseases. J R Stat Soc. https://epub.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/1573/1/paper_183.pdf. Accessed 20 Nov 2015.
Lawson, A. B. (2013). Bayesian disease mapping: hierarchical modeling in spatial 
epidemiology. Boca Raton: CRC Press.
Page 11 of 11Carcach and Artola  Crime Sci  (2016) 5:13 
Lunn, D. J., Thomas, A., Best, N., & Spiegelhalter, D. (2000). WinBUGS—a Bayes-
ian modelling framework: concepts, structure, and extensibility. Stat 
Comput, 10, 325–337.
MacNab, Y. C. (2010). On Bayesian shared component disease mapping 
and ecological regression with errors in covariates. Stat Med, 29(11), 
1239–1249.
Mollié, A. (2000). Bayesian mapping of Hodgkin’s disease in France. In J. P. Elliot, 
J. C. Wakefiled, N. G. Best and D. J. Briggs (Eds.), Spatial epidemiology. 
Methods and applications (pp. 267–285). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Rivera Virúes, J. J. (2014). Pandillas, Desaparición de Personas y Derechos 
Humanos en El Salvador. Unpublished master´s thesis, Facultad Lati-
noamericana de Ciencias Sociales, México. http://bibdigital.flacso.edu.
mx:8080/dspace/handle/123456789/5477. Accessed 15 Nov 2015.
Rozema, R. (2008). Urban DDR-processes: paramilitaries and criminal networks 
in Medellín, Colombia. J Lat Am Stud, 40(3), 423–452.
Sánchez-Aiscorbe, M. (2014). Why are so many young boys disappearing in El 
Salvador? Aljazeera America. http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/
america-tonight/articles/2014/9/25/why-are-so-many-youngboysdisap-
pearinginelsalvador.html. Accessed 20 Nov 2015.
Santamaría, G. (2014). Drugs, gangs and vigilantes: how to tackle the new 




Savenije, W., Van der Borgh, C. (2014). Anti-gang policies and gang responses 
in the Northern triangle the evolution of the gang phenomenon in 
Central America. The broker online. http://www.thebrokeronline.eu/
Articles/Anti-gang-policies-and-gang-responses-in-the-Northern-Trian-
gle. Accessed 20 Nov 2015.
Spiegelhalter, D. J., Best, N. G., Carlin, B. P., & Van der Linde, A. (2002). Bayesian 
measures of model complexity and fit (with discussion). J R Stat Soc Series 
B Stat Methods, 64, 583–640.
Stone, H. (2011). As gang violence hits El Salvador, a new wave of disappear-
ances. The Christian science monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2011/1007/As-gang-violence-hits-El-
Salvador-a-new-wave-of-disappearances. Accessed 20 Nov 2015.
Stone, H. (2012). El Salvador sees drop in murders but rise in disappearances. 
The Christian science monitor. http://www.csmonitor.com/World/
Americas/Latin-America-Monitor/2012/0522/El-Salvador-sees-drop-in-
murders-but-rise-in-disappearances. Accessed 2 July 2016.
Stone, H. (2013). The murky question of disappearances in El Salvador: an El 
Faro investigation. InSight crime. Investigation and analysis of organized 
crime. http://www.insightcrime.org/news-analysis/the-murky-question-
of-disappearances-in-el-salvador-an-el-faro-investigation. Accessed 12 
Nov 2015.
US Department of State. (2016). El Salvador travel warning. https://travel.state.
gov/content/passports/en/alertswarnings/el-salvador-travel-warning.
html Accessed 4 July 2016.
Wolf, S. (2011). Maras. In T. Bruneau, L. Danmert, & E. Skinner (Eds.), Maras: gang 
violence and security in Central America (pp. 44–69). Austin: University of 
Texas Press.
